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This article evaluates the resilient challenges faced by Cuba’s economy during the six decades 
of the Revolution (1959–2019), mainly its historical external economic dependency upon a 
foreign country (the USSR and Venezuela) and the adverse consequences that occur when 
such relationship ends or deteriorates. Several hypotheses address that issue as well as others 
such as the hindrance of the US embargo/blockade aggravated by Donald Trump’s punitive 
sanctions and Cuban continuity of a centrally planned economy and predominance of state 
enterprises over the market and the non-state sector. The core is an analysis of performance of 
key economic indicators: GDP growth, gross capital formation, financial stability, mining-in-
dustry-agriculture output, tourism and exports of professional services. Hypotheses are tested 
with long-term statistical series elaborated and scrutinized by the author over half a century 
based on Cuban official sources, as well as legislation, articles by Cuban scholars and from 
news media. Among the results: external dependency has declined somewhat but demands 
deeper economic reforms, there are no countries currently capable and willing to fully re-
place Venezuela’s substantial aid, the ongoing crisis provoked by the deteriorating Venezuelan 
economy cum Trump’s sanctions should have lesser adverse effects than the 1990s crisis that 
resulted from the USSR disappearance. The article is a significant contribution to the study 
of Cuba’s external economic dependence and its consequences, and should be also worthy for 
other small economies and socialist countries.
Keywords: Cuban economy 1959–2019, external economic dependence, USSR and Venezuela 
economic relationships, evaluation of economic performance, impact of Venezuelan crisis and 
Trump sanction on Cuba, crises, anti-crisis policies.
1. Introduction and review of the literature
This article is a pioneer in the evaluation of the Cuban economy in the 60 years since 
the Revolution, given the dearth of scholarly work on the entire period, except for the 
occasional assessment of previous periods [Mesa-Lago, 1971; 1981; Zimbalist, Eckstein, 
1987; Rodríguez, 1989]. Historically, Cuba has endured economic dependence on a for-
eign country: before the Revolution with Spain and the Unites States, and under the Revo-
lution with the USSR and Venezuela. Economic dependence in general was the subject of 
deep analysis and heated debate in the 1960s and the 1970s around “dependency theory”, 
mostly elaborated by Latin American economists; this theory claimed that in the world 
capitalist system, developed countries exploit developing countries to extract a surplus 
that allows the former to thrive at the cost of the latter [Chase-Dunn, 2015]. Fidel Castro 
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argued, however, that such an exploitative relationship did not happen within the socialist 
camp: “The existence of an everyday increasing world socialist market permits economic 
cooperation and trade relations between developed and underdeveloped countries under 
conditions of independence (which) are very different than those existing between capi-
talists countries and their politico-economic colonies as was the case of the United States 
and Cuba. In this case, economic relations only function in behalf of the interest of the 
powerful nation contributing to keep their partners in a situation of underdevelopment” 
[Informe de la Delegación de Cuba, 1969, pp. 49–50]. There is no doubt that the relation-
ship with the USSR was quite beneficial for Cuba. The question is that despite it, Cuba 
failed to become more independent, and hence the collapse of the USSR had disastrous 
economic consequences for the island.
De Miranda argues that Cuba’s world insertion, typical of an underdeveloped coun-
try, determined the subordinated situation of the country in international economic rela-
tions; he studied how Cuban economic dependence (with Spain, the United States, the 
USSR, and Venezuela) persisted regardless of changes in Cuba’s economic-political sys-
tem [De Miranda, 2009]. Santamaria develops a profound historical analysis of Cuba’s 
relations and economic dependency with Spain during the colonial period and beyond 
[Santamaria, 2004].
There is a fair consensus that Cuba was economically dependent on the Unites States, 
e. g., 68.6 % of the island trade was with the USA, and she was recipient of the second 
largest U. S. investment in Latin America [Mesa-Lago, 1971]. Conversely, there was sharp 
disagreement on the results of such relationship: Marxists economists contended that 
the outcome was negative for Cuba and impeded a satisfactory degree of independence 
[Boorstein,1968; O’Connor, 1970], whereas market economists held the opposite view, 
claiming that Cuba was in the way of development precisely due to her ties with the Unit-
ed States [CERP, 1965; Farber, 2011]. One major goal of the Revolution was to eliminate 
such dependence.
In a history of the Cuban economy under the Revolution, the author used seven vari-
ables to assess performance, one of which was external dependence on the USSR based 
on two indicators: trade concentration/diversification1 and trade partner concentration. 
Other indicators were fuel supply, price subsidies to Cuban exports and Soviet imports, 
and other economic aid [Mesa-Lago, 2000]. Pérez-López analyzed Cuban economic rela-
tions with the CMEA, as well as trade subsidies and aid from the bloc to Cuba and how 
they disappeared with the dissolution of the CMEA and the USSR collapse [Pérez-López, 
1991].
On Cuban dependence on Venezuela, Romero pinpoints two major features of the rela-
tionship: Venezuela’s support through an “international subsidy” and the international pro-
jection of the alliance via an “ideological package” for other countries; he explores three al-
ternative scenarios and decides for a continued relation despite serious difficulties [Romero, 
2018]. Vidal measures the value of the economic relationship and assesses the impact of the 
“Venezuelan shock” on the Cuban economy [Vidal, 2014]. Hernández-Catá compares the 
worth of Cuba’s economic relationship with the USSR and Venezuela, the subsequent chocks 
1 An anonymous referee questioned whether a high concentration of exports could be an indicator of 
dependence; the answer is positive but not necessarily on external dependence on another country. In the 
case of Cuba, however, high export concentration on sugar was related to high trade partner concentration 
with both the USA and the USSR. 
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provoked by the collapse/deterioration of the helper country, and their different magnitude 
[Hernández-Catá, 2013]. Mesa-Lago and Vidal provide a comprehensive analysis of the re-
lationship: its historical evolution, its overall value and major elements (the exchange of fuel 
for professional services, trade of goods and investment), its decline, and a projection of the 
cost for Cuba of losing Venezuela’s vital pipeline [Mesa-Lago, Vidal, 2019].
This article goes beyond all previous work, setting hypotheses on three constant fac-
tors in the 60 years of the Cuban revolution (dependence on USSR and Venezuela, a mod-
el of central planning and the US embargo/blockade) and how they have shaped economic 
performance; testing them with statistics and other materials.
2. Methodology 
The article has four interconnected hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1a. Despite the medium-term benefits of Cuba’s dependence on the USSR 
and Venezuela, in the long-run the island has been unable to transform its economic 
structure in order to attain self-sustainable economic growth and steady development, 
specifically to finance her imports with her own exports, without price subsidies (to ex-
ports and/or imports) provided by the foreign partner; 
Hypothesis 1b. When the economic relationship with the foreign partner ends (USSR) 
or significantly deteriorates (Venezuela), the Cuban economy suffers a severe crisis, dif-
ficult to overcome. 
Hypothesis 2a. Compounding the dependency problem, two additional adverse fac-
tors are: internally, Cuba’s economic model of central planning and the overwhelming role 
of state enterprises and collectivized agriculture over the market and private property; 
and, externally, the American embargo/blockade imposed since 1962 and tightened under 
Donald Trump’s administration.
Hypothesis 2b. The combination of external dependence, an inefficient economic 
model, and the embargo/blockade has led to a poor economic performance. 
Hypothesis 3. The degree of Cuba’s economic dependence has declined somewhat 
under the Revolution: the ongoing crisis caused by the Venezuelan crisis cum Trump’s 
sanctions probably will be of lesser magnitude than the 1990s crisis caused by the disap-
pearance of Soviet aid. 
Hypothesis 4. There is a low probability that another powerful foreign country (Russia 
or China) fully replaces Venezuela. 
Testing the four hypotheses relies on primary empirical data: long-term statistical 
series elaborated and scrutinized over half a century by the author based on Cuba’s main 
official source: the National Office of Statistics and Information (Oficina Nacional de Es-
tadísticas e Información — ONEI). Due to changes in methodology to calculate Cuba’s 
gross domestic product (GDP) and other key macro indicators, it is impossible to have 
an entire series for the revolutionary period 1959–2018, therefore most comparisons are 
based on the year 1989 — before the collapse of the USSR and when the Cuban economy 
was at its peak — and 2018 (the latest year available for statistics). In other cases, the focus 
is placed on the period of Raúl Castro’s economic reforms (2007–2017). Additional pri-
mary data comes from the U. N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Carib-
bean (ECLAC), valuable to do comparisons of Cuba’s economic performance with that of 
other countries in the region. Third primary source is Cuban legislation particularly from 
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the last decade. Secondary sources are scholarly publications of Cuban economists, as well 
as Cuban leaders’ speeches, and newspapers and blogs both from inside and outside Cuba. 
The author’s numerous works published in the last 55 years on the Cuban economy pro-
vide additional support on this endeavor. Data for the article ends on November 15, 2019.
3. Cuba’s external economic dependence (1960–2019)
Three important factors have been constant in the 60 years of the Revolution.
Cuban economic dependency on a foreign nation ( Hypothesis 1a). This is a historical 
fact; during its time as a colony, Cuba was economically dependent on Spain; under the 
first Republic it was reliant on the United States (68 % of Cuba’s total exports); in the first 
three decades of the Revolution it relied on the Soviet Union (72 % of total exports); and 
since the 21st century Cuba has depended on Venezuela (peak of 44 % of total exports in 
2013). Herein Hypothesis 1a is tested regarding the USSR. 
In 1960–1990, the USSR granted Cuba 65.119 mln doll. US (trice the aid of president 
John F. Kennedy’s program “The Alliance for Progress” provided to Latin America), an 
average of 2.170 mln doll. US annually over the period2. About 60.5 % of the total eco-
nomic relationship was in non-repayable price subsidies and showed a rising trend until 
1986: The USSR paid as much as twelve times the world market price for Cuban sugar, 
bought nickel at three times said market price, and Soviet oil exports were sold below 
the world market price and met 92 % of Cuban fuel needs. Out of the total repayable aid 
received from the Soviet Union, Cuba repaid only 0.7 % (in 2018 the Russian Federation 
absorbed the remained debt of mln doll. US and condoned the principal). In the 1980s, 
Cuba’s reached the highest economic indicators under the Revolution; in addition, Soviet 
aid liberated domestic resources to strengthen Cuban social services that were ahead of 
most countries in Latin America as well as in socialist countries of Eastern Europe and 
Asia (Table 1) [Mesa-Lago, 2000]. 

















1960–1970 2.083 344 2.427 1.131 3.558 68.2 31.8
1971–1975 1.649 749 2.398 1.143 3.451 67.8 32.2
1976–1980 1.115 1.872 2.987 11.228 14.215 21.0 79.0
1981–1985 4.046 2.266 6.312 15.760 22.072 28.6 71.4
1986–1990 8.205 3.400 11.605 10.128 21.733 53.4 46.6
Total 17.098 8.631 25.729 39.390 65.119 39.5 60.5
Note. a — military aid (13.400 mln doll. US in the period) and hard-currency revenue in the 1980s by Cuba re-
exporting unconsumed subsidized Soviet oil imports.
B a s e d  o n:  [Mesa-Lago, 2000]. 
2 Adjusted for inflation the sum would much higher in 2019. 
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Due to this enormous level of dependence, the disappearance of the USSR at the start 
of the 1990s provoked the worst Cuban economic crisis since the Great Depression (Hy-
pothesis 1b): GDP shrunk 35 % in 1989–1993; agricultural-fishing output fell 54 %, nickel 
output 34 %, manufacturing 28 %, services 26 %, and exports and imports 75 % [Mesa-La-
go, 2000]. At its peak in 2012, Venezuelan trade of goods and services accounted for 22 % 
of Cuba’s GDP; the main element of the economic relationship is the barter of Venezuelan 
oil for Cuban professional services (mainly physicians, but the price paid for them is about 
seven times the average salary of a Venezuelan physician); later the article shows the ad-
verse effects of the decrease in Venezuela’s trade and aid (testing of Hypothesis 1a and 1b 
regarding Venezuela is done in section 5).
The two adverse factors identified in Hypothesis 2a are:
the economic model. Despite Raúl Castro’s structural reforms that in 2007–2018 ex-
panded the non-state sector and the subsidiary market role, the essential characteristics of 
the model persevere: central planning and state enterprises predominant over the market 
and private property, a model that has not worked all over the world. Neither the Sino-
Vietnamese model of “market socialism” nor the types of reforms implemented in Eastern 
Europe (including the Russian Federation) have been followed by Cuba. The new Consti-
tution enacted in 2018 and the new president of the Council of State Miguel Diaz-Canel 
emphasize continuity;
US embargo/blockade. This started in 1961 and caused an officially estimated cost of 
US 755.000 mln doll., annually documented by the Cuban government; for many years, 
virtually all members of the United Nations have condemned the embargo/blockade eve-
ry year. The Trump administration has tightened the embargo/blockade on investment, 
tourism, remittances, and oil supply (see section 6). 
4. Cuba’s economic performance 
Due to the three persistent factors explained above and despite substantial external 
economic aid, the Cuban economy has had an unsatisfactory performance (Hypothesis 2b).
4.1. Economic growth and gross capital formation
GDP growth peaked at 12.3 % in 2006  (when Raúl Castro took over power from 
Fidel) and fell to 1.8 % in 2017. In December 2018, president Díaz-Canel announced a 
growth rate of 1.2 % for the year, but when ONEI published national accounts in 2019, it 
doubled the growth rate (Figure 1), making significant revisions to the data: rather than 
declining by 2.2 %, construction jumped 9.3 %; agriculture and livestock did not fall 4.9 % 
but increased 2.6 % and public health rose from 1.3 % to 3 % [Figueredo et al., 2019]. 
The growth rate target for 2019  is 1.5 %, which is deemed unattainable by most 
experts inside and outside of Cuba because of the impact of the Venezuelan crisis and 
Trump’s punitive measures (see sections 4 and 5). Based on the slowdown in tourist ar-
rivals, reduction in professional services exports, low world market prices for sugar and 
nickel, Trump’s measures, reduction of imported inputs, and a deterioration in the exter-
nal trade balance, ECLAC projected in July an annual growth for 2019 “close to 0.5 %” and 
estimated that 26 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean would have growth rates 
superior to Cuba’s [ECLAC, 2019a]. The average annual growth in 2016–2019 (including 
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ECLAC’s projection for 2019) is 1.2 %, an indication of stagnation and below the growth 
rate of 5–7 % set by Cuban leaders as essential for appropriate and sustainable develop-
ment. 
The higher gross capital formation (GCF) as a percentage of GDP, the higher the 
economic growth rate and vice versa. GCF averaged 9.7 % in the last five years (Figure 2), 
compared to the 25 % that a consensus of Cuban economists considers required for ad-
equate growth rates; the 25 % percentage was achieved in 1989 and it has not come close 
Fig 1. Cuba’s GDP growth, 2006–2019
B a s e d  o n:  [ONEI, 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; ECLAC, 2019].
Fig. 2. Cuba’s gross capital formation and fiscal deficit, 2007–2018
B a s e d  o n:  [ONEI; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019].
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to that rate since then. In 2018, the GCF average in Latin America was 18.7 %, about twice 
the Cuban figure [ECLAC, 2019a].
5. Fiscal deficit and inflation
After a decline in 2008–2013, the fiscal deficit rose from 1.3 % of GDP to 8 % in 2013–
2017 (Figure 2). ECLAC reports a deficit of 8.8 % in 2018, four times the regional average of 
2.1 %; the projected budget deficit in 2018 was 11.5 % but it was lower because expenditures 
were below the projection [ECLAC, 2019a]. The budget deficit has been financed by public 
bonds with 20-year maturity sold to the state bank with an annual interest of 2.5 % [Cuba 
Standard, 2018]. The significant rise in wages in half of the state sector (non-enterprises) in 
2019 is forcing to control public expenditures and avoid an increase in the deficit.
Since 1993, the worst year of the 1990s crisis, when it reached a peak of 26 % of GDP, 
inflation fell to 0.6 % in 2017 but jumped to 2.4 % in 2018 (Figure 3); there were at least 
three years with deflation over this period (1995, 2000 and 2016). But official data on the 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) measuring inflation is not reliable for three reasons: the gov-
ernment sets most prices, which are not determined by the market; the basket of goods 
and services used to estimate the CPI, as well as their weights, have never been published, 
so the methodology cannot be checked; and the CPI only includes prices in CUP and 
excludes prices in CUC3, used by the population to buy a good part of consumer goods at 
state shops and services sold by the self-employed.
Fig. 3. Inflation rate and monetary liquidity in the population hands, 1990–2018
B a s e d  o n:  [ONEI, 1991; 2001; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019].
Another indicator of inflationary pressure is monetary liquidity in the hands of the 
population or monetary surplus (cash in circulation plus bank savings), shown in Fig-
ure 3. Said surplus more than doubled in 2007–2018 (from 25.5 to 58.9 mln CUP); as a 
percentage of GDP, it jumped from 34.1 % to 58.9 %. The 2018 figure is the highest since 
3 Two currencies circulate in Cuba: the national peso (CUP) and the “convertible” peso (CUC); the 
latter is not traded internationally and is fixed by the government. The CUC is valued at par with the dollar 
and equals 24 CUP. 
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the 1993 peak, and also higher than the percentages in 1992 and 1994. Note that mon-
etary liquidity also excludes prices in CUC. To avoid further inflation, the government has 
raised funds through public bonds held by state-owned banks, thereby creating a financial 
bubble; when banks exhaust their ability to buy such bonds, the government will have to 
resort to monetary emission, which will feed inflation. The interest rate for the bonds is 
set by the government at 2.5 % below what would be the market rate, meaning that the 
ministry of finance is receiving funds at subsidized rates [Cuba Standard, 2018]. Inflation-
ary pressure in the second half of 2019 probably rose because of the cited wage increase.
5.1. Agricultural, cattle and fish production 
Agricultural-cattle output as a percentage of GDP declined from 4 % to 3.6 % in 
2007–2017, whereas its rate of annual growth at constant prices receded from 7.3 % to 
–1.5 %, and averaged 1.8 % per year in the period. The value of agricultural exports de-
creased 48 % in 2012–2018, but agricultural imports over the same period grew by 17 % 
and their share in total value of imports rose from 11 % to 17 % [ONEI, 2008; 2009; 2010; 
2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; Monreal, 2019]. In 2018, Cuba im-
ported 1.929 mln doll. US in agricultural products, 60 % of which could be produced in 
the country. Raúl Castro’s principal agrarian reform was usufruct: transfer of idle state 
Table 2. Agriculture, cattle, and fishing output, 1989 and 2009–2018 (thousand metric tons)




Tubers 681 1.565 1.515 1.445 1.452 1.580 1.670 1.743 1.843 1.828 1.801 –2
Plantain/banana 291 670 735 835 885 658 836 890 1.016 1.015 961 –5
Vegetables 610 2.540 2.141 2.200 2.112 2.406 2.499 2.424 2.285 2.483 2.454 –3
Rice 536 564 454 566 644 673 585 418 514 404  461 –32
Corn 471 327 324 354 360 426 429 363 404 373  345 –26
Beans 14 111 80 133 127 129 135 117 136 132 161 0
Citric fruits 825 91 345 264 204 167 97 115 119 98 71 –91
Other fruits 219 748 762 817 964 925 884 943 944 926 861 –11
Tobacco leaf 42 25 20 20 19 24 19 24 19 31 30 –28
Cow milk 924 600 630 600 604 589 588 495 613 536 577 –38
Eggsa 2.523 2.427 2.430 2.620 2.512 2.656 2.572 2.321 2.419 2.535 2.778 0
Cattleb 4.919 3.893 3.992 4.059 4.084 4.092 4.134 4.045 4.014 3.866 3.808 –22
Fish/seafood 192 65 55 49 48 51 56 57 52 52 51 –73
Note. Output in 2018 was below the 1989 level [CEE, 1991]; a — million units; b — thousand heads; figures in dark 
font denote the production peak.
B a s e d  o n: [CEE, 1991; ONEI, 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019].
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land to individual farmers, cooperatives, and state farms for their cultivation, with the 
government keeping land ownership. Its distribution began in 2008 and, because of its 
very marginal effects, the law was relaxed in 2012 and in 2018; statistics discussed herein 
show that usufruct did not increase output.
Table 2 compares the performance of 13 key agricultural, cattle, and fish products 
in 1989 (the eve of the economic crisis induced by the USSR collapse) and in 2009–2018; 
output peaks are indicated in bold. Production in 2018 was below the peak in 11 of the 
13 products (only grew for beans and eggs), with the decline ranging between 11 % and 
91 % in eight of them (rice, corn, citrus, other fruits, tobacco leaf, cow’s milk, cattle heads 
and fish-sea food); for seven products, the 2018 production level was below 1989 (all of 
the above except other fruits). In contrast, in the period there were notable increases in 
five products: tubers, bananas, vegetables, beans, and other fruits. 
5.2. Industrial and mining production 
Although there was a clear recovery since 2013, the index of industrial production in 
2018 was one-third below the level of 1989, 82 % below in sugar and 22 % below in the rest 
of the industrial sector (Figure 4). 
Mining production faded from 0.6 % to 0.5 % of GDP in 2007–2017 [ONEI, 2008; 
2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019]. Table 3 exhibits the 
output of eleven key mining-manufacturing products in 1989 and 2007–2018; the peak 
production level is denoted in bold. Output dwindled for ten of the eleven products and 
grew sharply for only two. In 2018, five products were below their 1989 level: sugar, steel, 
cement, textiles, and fertilizers. In contrast, output increased significantly in oil and natu-
ral gas; the former decreased after 2015 due to the exhaustion of wells and the failure of 
deep-sea oil prospecting, while gas fell after 2015. Nickel grew through 2007 and then 
Fig. 4. Index of industrial output, 1989–2018
B a s e d  o n: [CEE, 1991; ONEI, 1998; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 
2019].
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decreased, while cigars increased until 2016 and then declined. Output of medicines grew 
until 2015; the series was deleted thereafter, which usually indicates a decrease in output. 
5.3. Tourism 
By far, Cuba’s best economic performance has been in international tourism, cur-
rently the third source of hard currency. In the 1990s, Fidel Castro stimulated tourism; the 
number of visitors increased 17 times in 1989–2018 (Table 4), and its growth accelerated 
after 2015, due to the normalization of relations between the United States and Cuba un-
der the Obama presidency, which facilitated visits, air flights and cruises to the island. The 
average rate of growth of tourists, which in 2015–2017 was 15.7 %, dwindled to 1.2 % on 
2018 (see causes below); in addition, the total number of tourists decreased 20 % in June 
2019 relative to the same month in 2018 and 23 % relative to May 2019 [Perelló, 2019].
Tourism gross revenue (without subtracting the value of imports for the sector) grew at a 
lower rate than that of visitors in 2007–2018: 29 % and 118 % respectively, because aver-
age expenditure per tourist declined 40 % in that period. Since the early 1990s no data 
on tourism net revenue had been released; in 2019  the minister of economy and plan-
Table 3. Mining and manufacturing production, 1989 and 2007–2018 (thousand metric tons)




Oil 718 2.905 3.003 2.731 3.025 3.012 2.998 2.897 2.905 2.822 2.619 2.522 e –17
Natural 
gasa 34 1.218 1.161 1.155 1.072 1.019 1.034 1.066 1.200 1.245 1.185 1.051 970 –22
Nickel 47 73 70 70 70 72 68 55 52  54 51 53 50 –27
Sugar 8.121 1.193 1.445 1.388 1.164 1.242 1.454 1.568 1.633 1.924 1.501 1.100 1.050 –87
Steel 314 262 274 266 277 282 277 267 258 221 205 210 188 –40
Cement 3.579 1.805 1.707 1.626 1.631 1.731 1.824 1.659 1.579 1.517 1.493 1.430 1.590 –56
Elect-
ricityb 15.4 17.6 17.7 17.7 17.4 17.8 18.4 19.1 19.4 20.3 20.4 20.6 20.8 0
Textilesc 220 24 29 28 25 25 28 34 45 55 55 39 17 –92
Ferti-
lizers 898 22 40  9 22 39 30 21 32 44 57 72 43 –95
Cigarsd 308 412 386 375 376 392  392 411 423 412 426 417 280 –34
Medi-
cines 78 397 607 639 770 712 713 868 1.338 1.435 – – – –
Note. Figures in bold show the production peak; a — million cubic meters; b — thousand Gigawatts/hours; c — mil-
lion square meters; d — million units; e — there was a decline of 20 % in the first quarter of 2019.
B a s e d  o n: [CEE, 1991; ONEI, 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; Tor-
res, 2019; Rodríguez, 2019].
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ning reported that for every dollar of revenue generated by the tourism industry, more 
than 60 cents of imports were required [Gil, 2019b]. Using this percentage, net revenue 
of the tourism industry has been calculated for the entire period (Table 4): in 2018, it was 
161 mln doll. US, only 1.1 % of GDP that year and barely double the contribution of nickel 
to GDP. 
Table 4. Indicators of international tourism, 1989 and 2007–2018
Indicator 1989 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Visitors 








– 894 939 832 887 1.101 1.045 930 947 1.040 1.163 1.274 1.161
Rooms 
(thousands) 21.4 47.3 49.1 60.6 65.0 66.7 65.3 65.1 66.1 66.3 67.0 73.5 84.2
Occupancy 





622 1,039 998 856 875 921 1.087 814 787 736 720 684  616
Note. a — Estimated as 40 % of gross revenue, based on the 60 % official figure of imports in 2018.
B a s e d  o n: [CCE, 1991; ONEI, 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019]. 
The number of hotel rooms doubled in 1989–2007, and rose 78 % in 2007–2018. The 
percentage of rooms managed by the private sector grew to 36 % of the total in 2019, its 
share of gross income to 22 % and its growth rate was 18.5 % in 2018 compared with 3.8 % 
in the state sector [Perelló, 2018; ONEI, 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 
2016; 2017; 2018; 2019; Herrera, 2019]. Recently, the tourist infrastructure has been ex-
panded with the construction of five-star hotels in Havana, including the Kempinski’s 
“Gran Manzana” with rates as high as 1,000  doll. US per night [AFP, March 11, 2019]. 
Meanwhile average occupancy decreased 11  percentage points in 2007–2018  (Table 4). 
Also descending are average days of stay (–59 % in 1989–2017) and daily revenue (–23 % in 
1997–2016), whereas hotel losses have increased [Herrera, 2019; Romeo, 2019]. In view of 
these state-sector indicators, several Cuban economists have questioned the official strat-
egy of expanding hotel construction and investment in tourism (4 000 rooms and 3 mln 
doll. US in 2019, respectively) and have suggested focusing on quality rather than quantity.
Foreign tourists in 2018 came mostly from Canada (24 %), the USA (14 %), Cuban-
Americans (13 %), and between 3 % and 4 % Italian, German, Russian, French, English, 
and Spanish. The number of US tourists grew 590 % in 2014–2018, due to the thaw of rela-
tions between Cuba and the U. S., and this also pushed upward the trend from all emitting 
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countries until 2017. In the fourth quarter of 2017 and the first half of 2018, there was a 
decrease in tourism (208.296 fewer) for three reasons: damage to infrastructure caused by 
hurricane Irma in September 2017 particularly to facilities in the North Coast Cays; the 
ban by the Trump administration affecting US tourists staying at hotels and eating at res-
taurants run by the military; and the US government’s alert not to travel to Cuba because 
of the danger of sonic attacks that arguably affected diplomats. In 2018  Canadian and 
European visitors declined and Americans grew but at a much slower pace; only Cuban-
Americans increased substantially [ONEI, 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 
2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019]4. The government target for 2018 was 5.1 mln tourists but 
in September it was reduced to 4.8 million and the final figure was 4.7 mln. Cruise tour-
ists accounted for 45 % of total arrivals in 2018 and rose to 53 % in the first half of 20195. 
After June, when Trump’s suspension of cruise ships started, arrivals declined 15–20 % 
[Marrero, 2019; Perelló, 2019]. In January — October 2019, the number of tourists had 
declined by 303,920, 8 % less that in the same period of 2018; U. S. tourists decreased 13 % 
and even worst declines occurred on Western-European visitors [ONEI, 2019].
The initial plan for 2019 was for tourists to exceed 5 million tourists [Fuentes, 2018]. 
By the end of the first semester, the number of visitors had been revised to 4.3 million 
tourists for the entire year, which would be impossible to achieve in view of the October 
figures.
6. Cuba’s dependency on Venezuela and effects of its crisis
This section6 tests Hypothesis 1a and 1b pertaining to Venezuela. Throughout the rev-
olution, there has been a systematic deficit in Cuba’s trade balance of goods [Pérez-Lopez, 
2017]. Such a deficit reached a historical zenith of 10,400 mln doll. US in 2008 and then 
declined: while exports steady dropped after 2011, imports were cut also. Exports and im-
ports peaked in 2011: in 2018, exports of goods were 49 % below their 1989 level and 56 % 
below their 2011 level, while imports increased by 41 % and decreased by 18 %, respec-
tively. Consequently, the merchandise deficit in 2018 grew by 220 % compared to 1989 and 
11 % relative to 2011 (Table 5). Monetary and exchange rate duality are serious obstacles to 
increase exports because their distortions impede identifying profitable exports.
6.1. Exports of professional services to Venezuela
Starting in the 21st century, Cuba began exporting professional services (mainly doc-
tors, nurses, and teachers) based on a treaty with Venezuela, the buyer of about 75 % of 
those services. As a result, there was a surplus in the balance of services trade that not 
only offset the goods trade deficit, but generated a surplus in the overall balance of trade 
of goods and services (except in 2008 because of the huge deficit in goods) that reached a 
peak in 2014. Due to Venezuela’s severe economic crisis, the aforementioned surplus de-
creased by 51 % in 2014–2018. Table 5 calculates the value of Cuba’s professional services 
4 Russian tourists grew 12 % in 2018 but their participation is less than 3 % of the total [ONEI, 2008; 
2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019]. 
5 Cruise tourists spent 15 % of the amount spent by visitors arriving by air, contributing to the declin-
ing trend in daily expenses.
6 This section is mainly based on [Mesa-Lago,Vidal, 2019; ONEI 2019]. 
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Note. a — Official figures are given in «pesos» without specifying if in CUP or CUC; there is a consensus that they 
are in CUC similar to the US dollar; b — [ONEI, 2019] (table 8.3) gives a different series of the trade balance of goods 
with a higher deficit than in table 5.13 hence the global balance is smaller; c — exports of services less gross revenue from 
tourist services; d — ONEI gave for the first time the value of exports of services distributed by type for 2018 (see estimates 
of professional services in the text) [ONEI, 2019].
B a s e d  o n: author’s elaboration 1989 from [CCE, 1991; 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; ONEI, 2007; 2008; 
2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019].
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exports (subtracting the value of tourist revenue from total service exports): professional 
exports declined by 22 % in 2013–2017 (with an uptick in 2018), which is a major cause of 
the GDP decline from 7.3 % to 2.2 % in 2007–2018 [ONEI, 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 
2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019]. For the year 2018, ONEI revealed for the first 
time the value of total services exports distributed by type [ONEI, 2019]. The combination 
of human health and social care, education, other professional and technical services, and 
cultural and sports7 amounted to 6.700 mln doll. US. 
Bolivia, Brazil and Ecuador changed their governments and ended purchases of 
9.624 Cuban physicians, an annual loss of about 1 mln doll. US [Revelan cuanto Cuba…, 
2019; Ecuador ends…, 2019; Cuba withdraw…, 2019]. Angola and Algeria have reduced 
them, Mozambique revoked the exchange agreement, and the relationship with Kenya is 
in jeopardy. Despite those setbacks, professional services mainly from Venezuela remain 
Cuba’s main source of foreign exchange, their contribution to total exports (goods and 
services) rising from 56 % to 61 % in 2013–2018, albeit at a reduced value (Table 5).
6.2. Venezuelan oil supply 
Venezuela’s oil exports to Cuba have wilted considerably. At its peak in 2012, Ven-
ezuela exported 105 oil barrels per day (b/d) to Cuba, but supply dropped to 55.000 b/d 
in 2017 and 40.000 b/d in January — May 2019. In addition, PDVSA purchased 400 mln 
doll. US of Russian oil that was delivered to Cuba between January 2017 and May 2018. 
Total Cuban imports of fuels, lubricants and derivatives decreased by 69 % in 2007–2017, 
while Venezuelan imports dwindled by 67 %. Compounding this problem, Cuban crude 
oil production in thousand metric tons decreased from a peak of 3.025 in 2010 to 2.522 in 
2017; no data is available for 2018 [ONEI, 2013; 2018]. Thus, the reduction in fuel imports 
coincided with the drop in domestic production; it has been estimated that Cuba faces a 
deficit of 65,000 b/d of oil that has prompted a program of austerity and cuts in energy 
supply for businesses [Piñón, 2019]. 
6.3. Venezuelan subsidies to the price of  
Cuban professional services
Under the agreements with Venezuela, Cuba pays for the import of oil and its deriva-
tives with the sale of professional services. But the price of those services has been inflated 
(the Cuban state was paid for one of its doctors seven times what a Venezuelan doctor was 
paid, on average), so there was a significant subsidy in disguise. In addition, a considerable 
amount of crude oil from Venezuela was processed at the refinery in Cienfuegos, with the 
refined products forwarded to Venezuela; this business generated some excess produc-
tion of refined oil products that Cuba exported for a juicy foreign exchange gain (as it did 
with the USSR). The supply of oil to be refined in Cuba was halved in 2016, reducing the 
refined amount and exports. Venezuela is estimated to have lost a potential oil revenue of 
29.4 mln doll. US in its barter with Cuba in 1996–2017. 
7 “Health and social care services” account to 57 % of total services, while “educational services” are 
only 2 % and the rest represent even smaller shares. 
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6.4. Direct investment from Venezuela
In 2001–2014, the Intergovernmental Commission of the two countries approved 
475 Venezuelan investment projects in Cuba worth 8,000 mln doll. US. In addition, Ven-
ezuela’s Economic and Social Development Bank allocated 1,500 mln doll. US to finance 
projects in 2007–2010, while the Autonomous Fund for International Cooperation pro-
vided close to 1 mln doll. US in loans to Cuban companies. While some of these projects 
were not carried out and apparently disappeared after 2014, Venezuela’s direct investment 
has been significant, especially the Cienfuegos refinery. 
6.5. Value of Cuba’s total economic relationship with  
Venezuela and its components
Figure 5  shows the total value of the Cuba-Venezuela’s relationship, its composi-
tion and trends in 2007–2017 (no data are available for 2018). The total value peaked at 
16.017 mln doll. US in 2012 and declined by one half in 2017. All the components de-
clined between the peak and 2017: exports of professional services by 30 %, fuels by 70 % 
and non-oil trade by 85 %. 
Fig. 5. Economic relationship Cuba-Venezuela, 2007–2017 (mln doll. US)
B a s e d  o n: [ONEI, 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 2018; 2019].
In terms of GDP, the value of the economic relationship peaked at 22 % in 2012 and 
declined to 8 % in 2017, a decrease of 14 percent (Figure 6).
6.6. Potential effects of a total cut in Cuba’s relationship with Venezuela 
A fall of the current Venezuelan political regime or a collapse of its economy would 
have a severe impact on Cuba’s economy updated with recent data, based on [Mesa-Lago, 
Vidal, 2019]: 
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a) a loss of an economic relationship estimated at 8,000 mln doll. US annually; 
b) a significant drop in exports of professional services (professionals returning from 
Venezuela to Cuba would have to be provided jobs, otherwise, open unemployment 
would rise); 
c) a loss of about 1,800 mln doll. US in oil supplies at favorable financing terms; 
d) a deficit in the balance of payments, the halting of payments on the restructured 
debt, a worsening of defaults to foreign suppliers that would make it even more 
difficult to access foreign credit;
e) a harsh cut in imports that would have an adverse effect on industry and agriculture, 
thus worsening current food and consumer goods scarcities; 
f) electricity blackouts affecting the population, interruption of work at factories, 
and transportation problems; 
g) a serious retreat of the private sector; 
h) two-digit inflation arising from significantly rising monetary liquidity to levels 
similar or close to those in 1993; 
i) a depreciation in the exchange rate; and 
j) a decline in GDP in the range of 5 % to 7 %.
7. Trump’s punitive sanctions against Cuba and their effects 
Hypothesis 2a stated that the Cuban economy has further suffered due to the puni-
tive sanctions imposed by Donald Trump, both against Venezuela and Cuba [Mesa-Lago, 
Vidal, 2019].
Fig. 6. Economic relationship Cuba-Venezuela as percentage of Cuba’s GDP, 2007–2017
B a s e d  o n: see Figure 6 and GDP from [ONEI, 2007; 2008; 2009; 2010; 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015; 2016; 2017; 
2018; 2019].
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7.1. Tourism
We have noted measures taken to cut US tourism to Cuba. The US Executive com-
piled a list of restricted Cuban entities out of limits for American tourists that included 
military and intelligence agencies; the list has been expanded twice and now includes 
some 200 entities. These restrictions prompted US airlines to eliminate 2.574 flights, and 
flight occupancy declined from 61.3 % to 52.4 % between January-September 2017 and 
the same period in 2018. In June 2019, all travel to Cuba save for family purposes was 
banned, including via cruises, yachts and flights by private and corporate airplanes, as well 
as educational and “people-to-people” travel authorized by Obama in 2016 [United States, 
2019]. As most US tourists arrived by cruises and most air travelers used people-to-people 
tours, this is the second most damaging measure imposed by Trump; his sanctions may 
cost Cuba 1.383 mln doll. US [Prensa Latina, November, 2019]. Private micro-businesses 
have been affected by the drop in U. S. visitors [Mojena, 2019].
7.2. Venezuela’s oil supply to Cuba
In March 2019, Trump decreed a halt in shipments of Venezuelan oil to Cuba. Former 
US National Security Adviser John Bolton warned ship insurance companies that Washing-
ton would enforce such order. In July, the Treasury Department sanctioned Cubametales 
(Cuba’s state oil importer) as well as two foreign transport companies and blocked ownership 
of 34 Venezuelan oil agency (PDVSA) tankers, as well as two companies based in Liberia and 
Greece. As there are 4.5 oil tankers globally, enforcement through banning individual ships 
is complicated: just after the sanctions were announced, Maduro sent one million barrels 
of oil to Cuba on two ships and the Venezuelan foreign minister declared that his country 
will honor its oil commitments to Cuba. Several oil tankers have been renamed to avoid the 
sanctions and others have delivered oil incognito [Kassai, Bartenstein, 2019]. In September 
2019, new measures were imposed against several oil tankers, some of them based in Cyprus 
and Panama [OFAC, 2019]. Trump also ordered the seizure of revenue from Venezuelan 
oil sales in the USA, but Caracas diverted those exports to other countries and transferred 
the accounts of its oil companies to the Russian bank Gazprombank8. Because of cuts in oil 
supply, some cement factories have reduced output, a steel mill stop production temporarily, 
several hotels constructions in Havana have sent workers home, and state offices, universi-
ties and schools have cut hours; gas stations have long lines (Reuters, October 2, 2019). 
7.3. Strengthening sanctions on  
international banks that do business with Cuba
In late 2018, the Federal Reserve Bank imposed a fine of 1,340 mln doll. US on Societé 
General for violations of US sanctions against Cuba; also sanctioned have been PostFi-
nance, Standard Chartered (947 mln doll. US), Unit Credit (1.3 mln doll. US) and Paribas 
8 On October 28, 2019, Venezuela’s oil agency abroad (Citgo) must pay 913 mln doll. US to bondhold-
ers; if there is a default, Citgo may be seized by its creditors, including Russian oil company Rosneft [Krauss, 
2019]. On October 25, the US Treasury Department may decide to end a license to U. S. oil company Chev-
ron to continue its operations in Venezuela worth 2,700 mln doll. US; if that happens, Chevron must shut 
down and the Venezuelan government may transfer its share to a Russian company [Delgado, 2019]. 
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(8.9 mln doll. US). In 2019, Panamanian Multibank closed multiple bank accounts of Cu-
ban companies with which it had had transactions [Frank, 2019; Bancos extranjeros…, 
2019]. Fines were also levied on financial transactions (“U-turn”) in dollars by interna-
tional banks, in which the Cuban government or citizens receive funds transferred from 
abroad. These punitive measures make it extremely difficult for the island to do transac-
tions with foreign banks and nearly impossible to obtain private credit.
7.4. Foreign investment 
In March 2019, Trump ordered starting in May the application of Title III of the 
Helms-Burton Act, authorizing US citizens to sue in US courts Cuban companies (regis-
tered in the cited list of companies controlled by Cuban military or intelligence agencies) 
that “profited” from property confiscated by the Cuban government from their owners 
(that title had been suspended every six months from Clinton to Trump). Affected foreign 
companies are from Canada, Spain, France, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and even US 
airlines and cruise ships. Also, based on Title IV of the Helms-Burton law, the State De-
partment was ordered to deny US visas to foreigners who traffic in property confiscated by 
Cuba or executives or shareholders of companies that have conducted such activities. There 
are 5.913 certified lawsuits worth 1.9 mln doll. US; adding accrued interest the amount 
of the claims rose to nearly 8,000 mln doll. US. The application of Title III could lead to 
filings regarding some 200.000 uncertified claims worth tens of thousands of millions and 
would pack US courts (several already have been sued). The European Union and Canada 
have announced that they will use all potential legal avenues to impede the application of 
Title III against their nationals, including a demand to the WTO and countersuits against 
those presented in US courts. According to [ECLAC, 2019] the application of Title III rep-
resents an important disincentive to attract new flows of direct foreign investment, a flow 
that already is low. Although the more than one hundred existing investors apparently are 
staying the course, some big corporations have fled and potential investors are evaluating 
the totality of risks involved in doing business with Cuba, while yet others are postponing 
their decision until the results of the 2020 presidential elections are known [Frank, 2019]. 
The Helms-Burton sanctions have the potential to be the most impactful toward Cuba due 
to the island’s need to generate 2.5 mln doll. US annually in foreign investment. 
7.5. Foreign remittances 
The amount of remittances, mainly sent from the Unites States, rose from 1,400 mln 
doll. US in 2008 to 3,700 mln doll. US in 2018; they are the second most significant source 
of hard currency [Morales, 2019]. In April 2019, former National Security Adviser Bolton 
announced that such remittances will be limited to 1 doll. US per person quarterly, half 
the 2 doll. US per-quarter limit imposed by President George W. Bush in 2004 and later 
abolished by President Obama. This measure probably will not have a very strong impact 
for two reasons: remittances could be sent by several people in the USA, for example, a 
group of family members, to the same individual in the island, a trick that was used to 
circumvent Bush’s remittances cap; and most Cubans abroad do not send such a high level 
of remittances. However, the cap could affect micro-entrepreneurs on the island many 
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of whom have plans to establish or expand their activities counting on money sent from 
abroad by partners, relatives or friends (in September 2019, the US government exempted 
micro-entrepreneurs from the cap). 
7.6. Other current and potential negative sanctions 
In October, the US Department of the Treasury cancelled licenses for renting Cuban 
air and sea vessels, banned exportation to Cuba of products that have more than 10 % of U 
S components, and terminated US donations to Cuba that may end in government hands 
[Pentón, 2019]. In addition, Trump has threatened to return Cuba to the list of state spon-
sors of terrorism, from which Obama pulled it in 2015, after being so listed since 1982. 
Trump also stated in April 2019: “If Cuban troops and militias do not immediately cease 
military and other operations with the purpose of causing death and destruction to the 
Constitution of Venezuela, a full embargo will be imposed on the island of Cuba, along 
with sanctions at the highest level”. For his part, US Secretary of State Pompeo warned that 
“military action is possible and if that is required, the United States will take such action” 
[Casey, 2019; Rogers, 2019].
7.7. The magnitude of the ongoing crisis and that of the 1990s crisis
The combination of the Venezuelan crisis and Trump’s sanctions are already causing 
significant damage to the Cuban economy, which would worsen if Venezuela’s political 
regime were to fall or the economic deterioration deepen. Despite the worrying effects 
analyzed above, however, as posed in Hypothesis 3, the crisis in Cuba probably would not 
be as strong as that in the 1990s because of changing conditions (see Table 6): more di-
versified trade partners; lower main-partner share of Cuba’s total trade deficit; higher and 
more diversified foreign investment; much higher hard-currency revenue from tourism; 
considerably more foreign remittances; lower dependency on imported fuels; a much big-
ger private sector; and lower overall economic dependency.
All the above factors, however, may be shaken by Trump’s sanctions. In addition, 
Cuba in 1985–1989 had its best economic-social performance, whereas now the economy 
is in its worse situation since the 1990s. The crisis would be politically more difficult to 
manage because Fidel Castro is gone and Raúl Castro’s structural reforms raised high 
expectations that they would improve the economy and living standards, which did not 
materialize. 
8. The probability of either Russia or China replacing Venezuela 
Hypothesis 4 sustains that there is a low probability that either the Russian Federation 
or the Peoples’ Republic of China will fully replace Venezuela, although these two coun-
tries could help Cuba with trade and economic aid, as explained below.
In 2018 the Russian Federation was Cuba’s seventh trading partner, its trade of goods 
reached 3.3 % of the total, its deficit in the trade balance of goods amounted to 430 mln 
doll. US, the largest since the Russian Federation was created (Cuba imported 440 mln 
doll. US and only exported 11 mln doll. US) and Russia does not buy Cuban professional 
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services. However, in 2017 the trade of goods with Russia had risen 95 %, after a four-year 
decline and stagnation — the increase was only 20 % over 2007 [ONEI, 2019]. In Novem-
ber 2018, Havana signed several agreements with Moscow concerning: modernization of 
electricity production and steel; rail transport; exploration of bituminous oil deposits; and 
recovery of citrus production. The amounts of these projects were unknown and several 
of them had been agreed before. Early in October 2019, Russian Prime Minister Dmi-
trii Medvedev visited Cuba and signed eight agreements — some of them related to the 
previous ones — providing some data on the amounts: renovation of the railroad system 
including selling 75  locomotives — 51 has been delivered already (2,000 mln doll. US, 
but 200 mln doll. US by 2020); oil prospecting in land by Russian company Zarubezhneft 
(100 mln doll. US), application of atoms to medicine in agriculture (not energy), and sell-
ing military equipment (43 mln doll. US) (Granma, editions 7 to 18 October 2019). The 
revealed sums of short-term aid total 343 mln doll. US; although this aid is important to 
Cuba at this difficult juncture, it accounts to 14 % of the 2,500 mln doll. US in foreign in-
vestment that the island needs annually and to 4.3 % of the 8,000 mln doll. US provided by 
Venezuela. Russia has supplied oil to Cuba, but partly paid for by Venezuela. It is virtually 
impossible for Cuba to pay for the value of Russian imports because, as have been proven 
herein, production of sugar, nickel, citrus, tobacco and fisheries — which constituted Cu-
ban exports to the USSR in the 1980s — have declined sharply, and it is unlikely that Cuba 
will compensate Russian oil with exports of doctors and other professionals, who would 
have to learn the language. In addition, Venezuela pays Cuban doctors up to seven times 
Table 6. Comparison of Cuba’s economic dependence on the USSR and Venezuela
Factors in the economic dependence USSR 1987–1989
Venezuela 
2018
Greater diversification in commercial partners (% of trade volume) 72 29
Lower concentration of the trade deficit (% of total deficit) 82 28
Higher diversity in foreign investment (mln doll. US) 1a 7,676b
Higher hard-currency exports of professional services (mln doll. US) 0 8,861
Higher hard-currency revenue from tourism (mln doll. US) 168 2,903
Higher hard-currency revenue from remittances (mln doll. US) 0 3,500
Less dependence on imported fuels (% of total) 92 60
Bigger private sector (% of labor force) 6 26
Overall dependence (% of GDP) 28 8
Note. a — The USSR was the only investor, although for some projects there were associations with Eastern European 
partners. It was not possible to estimate the amount of Soviet investment; b — this information refers to all projects [Díaz-
Canel, 2019b], but in the Mariel Special Development Zone (ZEDM), while some 400 proposals have been mentioned, only 
43 foreign investment projects seem to have crystallized, 19 projects already in operation and 23 in process of approval, for 
a cumulative 2.1 mln doll. US in the six years since the creation of ZEDM, vis-à-vis a target of 15 mln doll. US for the period 
[Pérez Villanueva, 2019]. Besides, this information provided to the author from E. Morales by e-mail, August 30.
B a s e d  o n: USSR from [Mesa-Lago, 2000], Venezuela from [ONEI, 2009; Mesa-Lago, Vidal, 2019].
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more than an average Venezuelan doctor. Finally, Russia’s current economic slowdown 
makes it harder for her to fully replace Venezuela.
China could be another potential replacement: it is Cuba’s second trading part-
ner, with a 16 % share in total goods trade, but in 2018 said exchange was 1 % below the 
2017 level and 23 % below the 2016 level. The trade deficit with China was 1.088 mln doll. 
US (Cuba imported 1.544 mln doll. US and exported only 456 mln doll. US), tantamount 
to 23 % of Cuba’s total trade deficit, the largest after Venezuela’s [ONEI, 2019]. Relations 
between Beijing and Havana have strengthened in recent years, with an agreement signed 
in 2017 worth 164 mln doll. US to acquire Chinese construction equipment and a 129 mln 
doll. US donation for cybersecurity. However, these sums are minute when compared to 
huge Chinese investments in Latin America, especially in large countries that produce raw 
materials needed by China. By contrast, Cuba has virtually no products to export to Chi-
na — except 400.000 tons of sugar that must be sent annually — and it is even more diffi-
cult for it to export professional services, for language and cultural reasons. Finally, China 
is going through a period of slowing economic growth — the 2018 growth rate was the 
lowest since 1990 — and Trump’s rise in tariffs also has an adverse effect on the Chinese 
economy in 2019. It seems unlikely therefore that China could fully replace Venezuela.
9. Cuban government strategies and policy alternatives
Raúl Castro’s economic reforms in 2007–2017 were well oriented but too slow, not 
deep enough, and subjected to many restrictions, disincentives and taxes; because of those 
factors said reforms did not achieve an economic improvement as shown in section 3 
[Mesa-Lago, 2018; Mesa-Lago et al., 2018]. In his closing speech to the National Assembly 
in April 2019, Raúl Castro warned: “We have to be alert and aware that we face additional 
difficulties and that the situation could worsen in the coming months (due to the crisis in 
Venezuela and Trump’s policies), even if it is not returning to the situation of the special 
period in the 1990s, because today we have another panorama in terms of the diversifica-
tion of the economy. But we have to prepare ourselves for the worst scenario”.
President Miguel Díaz-Canel has promised continuity, which is incongruous to confront 
the deteriorating Venezuelan economy, Trump’s punitive measures and the absence of coun-
tries capable and willing to replace Venezuela. The strategy adopted by Cuban legislators in 
April 2019 was more long- than short-term, for instance: one of the targets of the 2030 plan 
is to secure 30 pounds of tubers, vegetables, beans and fruit per day to the population. The 
long-term plan to 2030 is divided in three stages: 2019–2021, 2022–2026 and 2027–2030, but 
no details have been given for each of these stages. It is vaguely said that the 2019–2021 stage 
will set the bases for future transformations through advances such as the implementation of 
a new management and administration model. The measures announced for 2020 (not for 
2019) are also imprecise, such as to concretize projects for increasing exports, to incorporate 
into the plan investments that stimulate oil extraction, to seek new product lines to replace 
imports, and to ensure the production of goods and services that meet domestic demand, 
food in particular. The plan reiterated old unsuccessful policies and goals, and continued to 
place emphasis on the central plan and state enterprises as the key economic tools, with little 
mention of the necessary acceleration and deepening of the reforms. 
Economics Minister Gil [Gil, 2019a] identified six strategic sectors that are key to 
confront the looming crisis: tourism, biotechnology-pharmaceuticals, food production, 
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electricity and energy, exports of professional services and construction. According to 
him, the growth in exports in the six cited activities (especially in the first three) represent 
more than 90 % of the projected export increases by 2030 and 65 % of the replacement of 
imports projected for that year. However, Gil acknowledged that exports do not grow with 
the required dynamism, foreign investment levels are low and poor use of energy products 
and non-compliance with the import plan persist. He added that internal measures (belt 
tightening) would need to be employed. 
Several Cuban economists pointed out problems in the government strategy: the huge 
and urgent problems that Cuba faces; a response marred by excessive caution, and lack of 
imagination, daring and quickness to confront the challenges; the absence in the discussion 
of the long-standing, broad consensus on needed economic reforms; the absence in the plan 
of policies regarding the private property and micro-enterprises which should be given pri-
ority; and the widespread scarcity of essential food items [Mesa-Lago, Vidal, 2019].
Perhaps prompted by the above reactions or by the realization of the magnitude and 
urgency of the crisis, in June 2019 Díaz-Canel announced new policies, the most concrete 
and widely discussed being the increase by 37 % in the wages of employees in the budgeted 
sector of the economy, as well as of pensions. The Cuban president also acknowledged 
important economic problems such as: increasing foreign debt due to insufficient revenue 
from exports, unpaid debts to suppliers, an import mentality that contravenes initiative 
and creativity, widespread corruption, and very low level of savings. To confront these 
problems, he proposed the following measures [Díaz-Canel, 2019a]: 
 • planning system: move away from current inefficient material allocation of resourc-
es towards economic and financial allotment; 
 • state enterprises: decentralize and grant them real autonomy; clearly define state 
functions as owner and administrator; replace current administrative controls by 
indirect regulatory mechanisms, such as economic and financial incentives; elimi-
nate state subsidies to enterprises;
 • local government: provide it with more autonomy, authority and decision-making 
power; 
 • foreign investment: put in place additional guarantees to investors regarding settle-
ment of their obligations (e.g., repatriation of enterprise profits); pay the current 
debt from retained profits by such gains in Cuban currency at favorable exchange 
rates, hence allowing the foreign company to pay expenses in national currency; 
expedite supplies of inputs for import- substitution operations; provide financial 
stimuli in direct investment agreements to promote exports and disincentivize im-
ports; support insertion of foreign-invested operation in value chains (e.g., chains 
of hotels and restaurants); create a new entity under the Council of Ministers to 
promote foreign investment; and allow Cubans abroad to invest in the island;
 • non-state sector: enact an enterprise law that eliminates barriers and grants autho-
rization to micro-businesses; eliminate redundant and unnecessary regulations; 
establish a national agency to oversee cooperatives, and convert some of them into 
micro- and medium-size enterprises9;
9 At the time this paper was being finalized, new regulations for non-agricultural and services coop-
eratives were enacted that banned the creation of new ones [Decretos-Leyes 366 y 356, 2019]. 
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 • exchange rate: continue the devaluation process (actually it has not started yet, save 
for some experiments in the past); redesign the monetary system;
 • foreign trade: decentralize it;
 • prices: make them more flexible, set them by agreement between the parties; 
 • salaries: the wage increase in the budgeted sector is the first step of a process of 
integral reform of the salary system;
 • food supply: stabilize the supply of essential foods, which were quite scarce in the 
first half of 2019 (some measures have been announced); and
 • multinational financial institutions: seek avenues to join them.
The above measures are appropriate but there are some caveats: First, several of them 
have been tried before in Cuba and then disregarded, e. g., enterprise autonomy and decen-
tralization as well as allocation of resources through financial-economic indicators rather 
by administrative tools (self-financing) were the subject of discussion in the economic 
policy debate of 1961–1966; they were attempted in the 1980s and Raúl’s reforms included 
decentralization of state enterprises but these policies were not implemented. Hence it is 
essential to wait if they are actually enforced. Second, they are still mere proposals (some 
schematic) that require more elaboration, debate, testing, first efforts at evaluation of their 
effects and implementation. Third, some measures are contradictory, for instance, the cap-
ping of prices in the private sector in August 2019 — to avoid inflation induced by the big 
wage increase — is an administrative action, opposite to the proposed indirect regulatory 
mechanisms, such as economic and financial incentives.
Fourth and the most important, the list above does not address key needed measures 
to accelerate and deepen the reforms which are endorsed by several well-known Cuban 
economists10:
 • consider the successful Sino-Vietnamese model, under the Communist party, es-
pecially in agriculture; 
 • implement unification of the exchange rate and of the dual currency; 
 • carry out a comprehensive price reform;
 • infuse more flexibility in the non-state sector, particularly private, so that it grows 
and contributes more to the economy; 
 • authorize professionals to work as self-employed, eliminate excessive barriers to 
self-employment, and replace the current list of authorized activities by one speci-
fying which are the ones banned and giving freedom on the rest;
 • end the experimental stage for non-agricultural and services cooperatives, approve 
more of them and create second degree cooperatives;
 • eliminate the compulsory sale of crops by farmers to the state, at prices set by the gov-
ernment below the market price (acopio) allowing farmers to plant what they want 
and sell all their crops to whoever they please at prices set by supply and demand;
 • establish wholesale markets that supply needed inputs to the non-state sector; and 
 • allow foreign companies to contract and pay directly to their employees.
In the 1990s, Fidel Castro introduced modest economic reforms that contained the 
severe crisis, todays leadership should follow his approach to confront the current crisis 
in Cuba.
10 The opinions of a dozen prominent Cuban economists are summarized in [Mesa-Lago, 2019].
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10. Conclusions
The four hypotheses in this study have been proven with abundant primary sources 
and robust evidence: mainly official statistics, the work of several Cuban scholars and our 
own analysis. 
Although somewhat reduced in the last two decades, external economic dependence 
persists making the island vulnerable to crises endured by the foreign partner over which 
Cuba lacks any control. Cuba’s economic relationship with the USSR totaled 65,000 mln 
doll. US in 1960–1990  and about 107,000  mln doll. US with Venezuela in 2007–2017; 
a significant part of which consisted in price subsidies to exports of raw materials and 
professional services, as well as to oil imports. Under Soviet aid, Cuba enjoyed a boom-
ing period in the 1980s, whereas in the case of Venezuela the best economic years were 
2005–2007, GDP rates didn’t recover such growth thereafter despite the rising Venezuelan 
aid in 2009–2014; with the decline in the relationship since 2016 Cuban GDP stagnated. 
Despite the substantial external aid, Cuba’s inability to finance her imports with her 
own exports continues (exports in 2018 were 48 % of those in 1989 whereas imports were 
41 % above). Such structural conundrum has been aggravated, domestically, by an ineffi-
cient economic model of central planning, not substantially transformed by the economic 
reforms of 2007–2017 and the current continuity in policies, and externally by the US em-
bargo/blockade significantly tightened by Trump’s punitive policies. As a result, economic 
performance has been inadequate: GDP has been stagnant in the last four years; gross 
capital formation is about one third of both what it was in 1989 and of the government 
growth target; inflationary pressure is approaching the worst years of the 1990s crisis; the 
fiscal deficit shows a rising trend; with few exceptions, output in agriculture, fishing, min-
ing and manufacturing have declined in the last decade and in most cases is below the 
1989 level; tourism is the best performer but net revenue is 40 % of gross revenue (due to 
high cost of imports for tourists) and declined in 2019 due to Trump’s sanctions. 
The crisis in Venezuela has led to an equivalent loss of 14 percentage points off of 
Cuba’s GDP, mainly due to a 30 % decrease in the value of exports of professional services 
and a 70 % decline in oil imports; if the current relationship ends, it will cost Cuba another 
8 percentage points of GDP. It was not possible to measure the cost of Trump’s measures 
against Cuba, but they are already provoking a loss of tourist revenue of about 1 mln doll. 
US, obstructing the supply of oil from Venezuela (aggravated by a decrease of 17 % in 
domestic oil output), and probably freezing foreign investment. There is a low probability 
that either Russia or China will fully replace Venezuela; Russian agreements in 2019 ac-
count to 4 % of the total value of Venezuela’s relationship. It is expected, however, that the 
ongoing crisis should have lesser magnitude that the one in the 1990s because of several 
factors that have improved, most of them external (trade-partner diversification, remit-
tances, tourism and investment), but Trump’s sanctions make all of them vulnerable. 
The first wave of government policies to confront the crisis was at best inadequate; 
a subsequent second wave of rough proposals are more appropriate but with important 
caveats. Cuban economists have suggested more profound reforms that so far are not con-
templated in the official program but are fundamental to take Cuba out of the current 
abyss and provide hope for a better future.
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В статье оцениваются проблемы, с которыми сталкивалась экономика Кубы в течение 
шести десятилетий после революции (1959–2019  гг.), преимущественно связанные 
с  ее исторической внешнеэкономической зависимостью от иностранных государств 
(СССР и  Венесуэлы) и  неблагоприятными последствиями, возникшими в  условиях 
окончания или ухудшения отношений с данными государствами. Некоторые гипотезы 
исследования касаются также других проблем, среди которых — препятствие эмбарго/
блокаде США, усугубляющееся карательными санкциями Д. Трампа, кубинская преем-
ственность централизованной планируемой экономики и преобладание государствен-
ных предприятий над рынком и  негосударственным сектором. Основным методом 
исследования является анализ эффективности ключевых экономических показателей, 
таких как: рост ВВП, валовое накопление, финансовая стабильность, объем производ-
ства в  горнодобывающей промышленности и  сельском хозяйстве, туризм и  экспорт 
профессиональных услуг. Гипотезы тестируются на многолетних статистических ря-
дах, разработанных и  изученных автором в  течение полувека на основании кубин-
ских официальных источников, а  также законодательства, статей кубинских ученых 
и  средств массовой информации. Можно выделить следующие результаты анализа: 
внешняя зависимость несколько снизилась, но требует более глубоких экономических 
реформ; в  настоящее время нет стран, способных и  желающих полностью заменить 
существенную помощь Венесуэлы; продолжающийся кризис, спровоцированный 
ухудшающейся венесуэльской экономикой и санкциями Трампа, должен иметь менее 
негативные последствия, чем кризис 1990-х гг., возникший в результате исчезновения 
СССР. Выводы, полученные в статье, внесут вклад в изучение внешнеэкономической 
зависимости Кубы и последствий данной зависимости, а также могут быть использо-
ваны для анализа экономики других социалистических государств. 
Ключевые слова: кубинская экономика в 1959–2019 гг., внешнеэкономическая зависи-
мость, экономические отношения СССР и Венесуэлы, оценка экономических показа-
телей, влияние на Кубу кризиса Венесуэлы и санкций Трампа, кризис и антикризисная 
политика.
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